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In this paper a view is advanced that explains why the transition to markets did not 
always lead to the outcomes predicted by the Washington Consensus type strategies.  
Institutional portfolio theory is used to define a myriad of interests and goals of a 
transition economy.  A model is developed in which external intervention and increased 
external monitoring are shown to lead to lessening of the intrinsic motivation within 
transition economies to pursue the reforms as prescribed by Washington Consensus 
sometimes resulting in very slow growth rates or even a decline of the GDP. 
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The Pitfalls of Transition: Crowding Out the “National Virtues” 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, former 
socialist Central and Eastern European states (CEES) and newly independent states (NIS) 
embarked on the transition towards markets.  While that transition turned out to be 
anything but smooth for almost all the countries of the region, some countries were much 
more successful in that process than the others (Rodrik 2006).  Most countries followed 
the well-known prescription to first stabilize the economy, then to privatize it, and finally 
to liberalize it.  This “recipe” was most transparently codified in the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson 1990).  Ten recommendations in the original Washington 
Consensus were the fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform, 
financial liberalization, unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, 
openness to direct foreign investments, privatization, deregulation, and securing the 
property rights.  These were the policies strongly advised and promoted by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
  Many of the transition economies, in particular several NIS states formerly 
republics of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, could not manage to reach the levels of their 
1990 GDP even ten or fifteen years after they started the transition process (IMF 2006).  
There are a few explanations for this phenomenon but one seemed to have been dominant 
until recently.  Predominantly it was suggested that the Washington Consensus-type 
policy reforms are a great path to follow and only the lack of total commitment to these 
policies or “too little reform” may be responsible for prolonged transition characterized 
with serious recession (e.g., Collier and Dollar 2001; Krueger 2004).  Indeed, this view 
implies that the nature of the reforms should not be questioned but their success is 
dependent solely on the thorough implementation of these policies.  Another view 
championed by Sachs (e.g., Sachs et al. 2004) and illustrated in the U.N. Millennium   3 
Project (2005) puts the emphasis on the availability of foreign aid as a necessary 
condition for the success of the reforms.  Admittedly, this approach is more pertinent to 
the reforms in the less developed countries (LDCs) rather than in the CEES or NIS 
region. 
  An alternative view has emerged recently, surprisingly in the World Bank (2005) 
and was published in their report titled Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a 
Decade of Reform.  For the first time, it has been acknowledged that different countries 
may need to follow different paths in their transition to markets and thus policy diversity, 
selective and modest reforms, and experimentation, rather than the uniform cook-book 
type of policies, are needed in guiding the process.  While this seems to be a fairly 
obvious proposition to a non-economist, it complicates the lives of a number of the 
western-trained economists, business and economics practitioners, and western economic 
advisors, both independent and those operating within the World Bank, the IMF, a variety 
of government agencies, or other commercial or think-tank entities.   
  The complexity arises due to several reasons.  First, different CEES and NIS 
nations have different cultural, historical, political, and economic heritage.  Second, 
different nations have a different vision of where they want to go in their future and how 
they are to arrive there.  In other words, most nations have multiple objectives in both 
short- and long-run strategies of their national development.  Creating a market economy 
may be only one of the objectives, often in direct conflict with some other objectives.  
Third, developed market economies have their own agenda and set of goals into which 
they are trying to fit the actions of the CEES and the NIS economies.  Fourth, most 
existing international financial, trade, political, economic, or military organizations have 
been clearly designed with the interest of the current member-countries in mind.  In other 
words, for potential member-countries it is necessary to either significantly adjust their 
development programs to fit the views and the visions of these organizations if they are 
to become a part of them, or these organizations must exhibit a great deal of flexibility 
and change the way they operate, to some extent, in order to ease and accommodate 
joining of the potentially new member-countries. 
  In this paper, a view is advanced and a simple model is developed that explains 
why the transition to markets in some of the CEES and NIS countries did not always lead 
to the outcomes predicted by the Washington Consensus-type policies.  Indeed, the 
involvement of the international organizations and promoting of the joining of the various 
economic and political entities such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), NATO, etc., as the ultimate goal for the transition, economies may 
have impeded the progress of the reforms in these countries and ultimately their 
economic growth.  Organizational portfolio theory is used in its modified form, called the 
institutional portfolio, to define a myriad of interests and goals that a transition country 
normally has in its development program.  Then, a model is developed in which external 
intervention and increased external monitoring may lead to lessening of the intrinsic 
motivation within transition economies to pursue the reforms as prescribed by 
Washington Consensus.  This sometimes results in very slow growth rates or even a 
decline of the GDP and conditions under which this situation may occur are identified.  
Finally, implications of this model are discussed. 
2. National Interests, Institutional Changes, and the Organizational Portfolio 
Theory   4 
Organizational portfolio theory represents a relatively new theory that treats the 
organization as a portfolio of causes of organizational performance (Donaldson, 1999, 
2000).  This theory is designed to explain the performance-driven organizational change 
at the firm level.  Miljkovic (2006) extended the theory to fit the international non-profit 
membership organizations in which the members are independent and sovereign nations 
(or regions) with very diverse interests. 
  Organizational portfolio theory begins with a premise that there are various 
internal and external causes that affect organizational performance.  Organizational 
performance, in turn, feeds back to drive organizational change such that the organization 
moves into fit with its situation.  Organization theorists argue that organizational 
performance has to become low so there is a crisis before it triggers adaptive 
organizational change.  Adaptive organizational change will not occur if there is only a 
decline of organizational performance from the maximum level.  This is because 
organizations have a tendency to satisfice rather than maximize (Simon 1976).  There 
exists a satisficing level of performance, substantially below the maximum level, that the 
organization strives to maintain.  The satisficing level is that level of performance that the 
managers of the organization consider to be satisfactory or acceptable.  Organizations 
satisfice rather than maximize because of bounded rationality.  In other words, there are 
limits on the decision-making capacity of managers given inadequacies, such as in their 
knowledge (March and Simon 1958).  Managers solve problems to restore performance 
so as to regain the satisficing level.  Since the satisficing is a property of managerial 
decision making in general, it follows that adaptive organizational change of any kind 
should occur only when organizational performance falls below the satisficing level, 
because all adaptive organizational changes result from managerial decisions.  Empirical 
research supports satisficing theory, in that low organizational performance is the trigger 
for adaptive organizational change in organizational strategy and structure (e.g., Cibin 
and Grant 1996; Donaldson, 1994, 1987; Smith et al., 1990).  Specifically, low levels of 
sales, profit, and earnings per share produce the needed adaptive structural change among 
large corporations (Donaldson 1987). 
  A key question is then why does the crisis or low performance of an organization 
occur?  According to the organizational portfolio theory (Donaldson 2000), we need to 
consider that the causes of organizational performance form a portfolio, and each cause is 
termed a factor in the organizational portfolio.  These organizational portfolio factors 
include causes of organizational performance inside the organization and outside it.  Each 
organizational portfolio factor has a risk, defined as the variation over time in 
organizational performance that results from that factor.  Each organizational portfolio 
factor is also correlated to some degree, positively or negatively, with each other 
organizational portfolio factor.  Thus, each organizational portfolio factor becomes a 
trigger of change when, either, it reaches a particular threshold, or interacts with another 
factor, stimulating threshold levels that trigger change.  The greater (lower) the risk of 
each organizational portfolio factor and the higher their positive (negative) correlation 
with each other, the higher (lower) the organizational risk, defined as the variation over 
time in organizational performance.  Moreover, each organizational portfolio factor is 
correlated to some degree, positively or negatively, with organizational misfit, which can 
be interpreted as the moderating variable.  The higher the risk of each organizational 
portfolio factor and the more it is positively correlated with organizational fit, the greater   5 
the probability that organizational performance fluctuates down to a low level when the 
organization is in misfit, because both the portfolio factor and misfit are simultaneously 
depressing performance.  
  Therefore, considering the whole portfolio, the higher the risk of the 
organizational portfolio factors and (or) the more they are positively correlated with 
organizational fit, the greater the probability that organizational performance fluctuates 
down below the satisficing level, so that the adaptive organizational change occurs.  The 
opposite holds as well: the lower the risk of the organizational portfolio factors and (or) 
the more they are negatively correlated with organizational fit, the lower the probability 
that organizational performance fluctuates down below the satisficing level, so that the 
adaptive organizational change is less likely to occur.  An organization in this position 
will continue to have satisfactory performance but will fail to make needed adaptive 
changes, so its performance will fall below its potential over time.  Therefore, in 
analyzing each organizational portfolio factor, we need to understand its risk and whether 
it is positively or negatively correlated with organizational misfit.  Where the depressing 
effect on organizational performance of organizational misfit is counteracted by some 
other portfolio factor buoying performance, this can be termed a portfolio effect. 
  Independent nations are much more complex entities than individual firms, or 
national and international organizations.  Most firms or organizations are first created and 
then later evaluated based on a single goal or a small set of goals they set out for 
themselves.  The complexity of a nation’s existence arises primarily due to number and 
diversity of its constituting elements starting with its citizens, followed by a large number 
of internal political, social, economic, legal, business, cultural, and many other types of 
institutions and organizations.  Each of these constituting elements has their own goals. 
Many external factors including global or regional political, economic, natural, and other 
environments add to that complexity.  Yet the basic idea of the organizational portfolio 
theory can be modified and applied to the operating of a nation.  There are many internal 
and external factors that affect economic development and performance of a nation.  
Economic performance of a nation provides a feedback in order to drive institutional 
changes within the society such that the nation moves into fit with its situation. 
  The CEES and the NIS countries differ from other established nations in two 
basic respects: (1) many of them are completely new entities that need to form and 
develop their institutions from scratch, and/or (2) they are trying to get rid of existing 
institutions and accept a set of new ones before fully understanding the implications that 
this change may have on every aspect of their existence as a nation.  In their process of 
transition, the CEES and the NIS countries have many different and often conflicting 
objectives.  For instance, many of these countries are experiencing complete 
independence for the first time, i.e., for the first time ever they are sovereign nations, and 
are trying to learn about their place and role in the global and regional environments.  
Economic growth and development are often priorities implying a strong emphasis on 
changing economic or financial institutions.  At the same time, many of these countries 
(e.g., all former Yugoslav republics except Slovenia; most former Soviet republics) are 
trying to create and establish their national identity.  Some of them went through the 
period of civil war with the primary goal of gaining independence.  Being a member of a 
union called, for instance, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia for 70 years may discourage 
some of these countries from being enthusiastic about immediately joining another union   6 
– even if it is called the European Union – before they could enjoy their independence or 
understand how the rest of the world perceives their independence. Thus, economic or 
political integration with the developed western nations through joining their political, 
trade, financial, or military organizations or alliances, however important, may not be 
perceived by leaders and citizens of some of the CEES and the NIS nations as their 
priority.  If this is coupled with strong historical and traditional heritage that is 
considerably different from western practices,
1 odds are that any external pressure on 
these countries to speed up their political and economic transition may instead 
considerably slow down the transition process and the transformation of traditional 
domestic institutions into western-like institutions.  Another thing that can undermine the 
effect of external pressures on the extent of institutional changes is the success that some 
of the formerly communist economies such as China enjoyed in their transition by 
following a very different path from one prescribed by the Washington Consensus.  
China’s integration into the world’s economy and the rate of economic growth has been 
unprecedented during the last 10 to15 years.  Yet all that happened without undertaking 
the radical institutional changes prescribed by the Washington Consensus and its 
proponents (Rodrik 2006). 
  National interest goals in transition economies are many, but it seems reasonable 
to assume that they can be generalized and summarized as the following.  Each country 
would like to ensure its political and economic stability along with the high economic 
growth rate that would improve the welfare of its citizens.  The institutional portfolio 
factors that determine the level of performance of this transition process may be reduced 
to internal and external factors in order to simplify the analysis.  The internal factors are 
under control of domestic institutions and citizens and include, but are not limited to, 
internal processes and mechanisms that enable the operating or change of the existing 
institutions in the country; a diversity of internal goals among different agents in the 
economy; strengthening the notion of national identity and sovereignty; desire to preserve 
national, historic, and cultural heritage; resistance to change; or the ability to adopt new 
goals.  External factors are not under control of domestic institutions and citizens and for 
the purposes of this model they include the pressures and the influence of foreign 
countries and international economic, financial, trade, military or political organizations 
or alliances to pursue a certain model of transition to a market economy such as the 
Washington Consensus.  Indeed, many foreign countries and international organizations 
offer “free” advice and expertise in how to proceed with the transition process.  A “stick 
and carrot” approach is often used in this “independent” advisory process with an array of 
incentives promised to the followers and punishments outlined for those who chose a 
different path.   
  Internal and external factors in the institutional portfolio may interact in different 
ways and affect the performance of a transition economy with respect to its goals defined 
as the achievement of political and economic stability coupled with the welfare-
improving economic growth rate.  The next section outlines the model which explains 
under what circumstances the external factors would lead to a slow down or decline in 
performance of a transition economy. 
 
3. The Model – The Hidden Costs of Control and Reward   7 
  The idea behind the model developed here is that too much external control or 
monitoring of institutional change in a transition economy may lead to a slow down in 
economic growth and in institutional changes.  There is not a similar model developed so 
far, to the best of our knowledge, dealing with the processes of institutional change in 
transition economies.  However, the idea of the hidden costs of control and reward are 
not new in labor economics.  In particular, there is rapidly developing literature in the 
field of experimental economics with applications to labor issues with regard to 
measuring the consequences of control on motivation of workers.  Most experimental 
studies are developed as a principal-agent game (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; 
Benabou and Tirole 2003; Fehr and List 2004; Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  Yet theoretical 
models are few in this field and most notable ones include, among others, Frey (1993, 
1997) or Osterloh and Frey (2004).  Finally, there are a few empirical applications based 
on these models (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1996; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and 
Eichenberger 1996).  Our model of institutional transformation in a transition economy 
follows closely Frey (1993, 1997) but focuses on the effect and the interaction between 
internal and external factors on institutional transformation as the conditio sine qua non 
for achieving the political and economic stability along with the high economic growth 
rate. 
   If one is to consider this problem in the principal-agent framework, the 
“international community” may be considered the principal while the transition economy 
may be considered an agent.  According to this theory, the principal has a set of goals for 
the agent to achieve which coincide with its own goals.  Also, the principal has a set of 
policy instruments (e.g., economic, financial, military) at its disposal that should ensure 
the agent’s compliance with a set of actions proposed or designed by the principal for the 
agent to follow in order to accomplish the goals.  We will show that even when the agent 
has the same set of goals as the principal, too much external control and monitoring by 
the principal is likely to slow down or even to reverse the agent’s effort and performance. 
  Three types of psychological processes are assumed in this model.  First, when a 
psychological contract exists between principals (the international community 
institutions) and agents (the transition economies), the agents may perceive increased 
monitoring or external involvement as an indication of distrust, and this may induce them 
to reduce or slow down the institutional change leading to a slow down in economic 
growth.  Second, if transition countries perceive the external intervention as controlling 
so the extent to which they can determine actions independently is significantly reduced, 
intrinsic motivation is substituted by external control, i.e., the locus of control moves 
from the inside to the outside of the transition country itself.  In other words, countries 
which are forced to behave in a specific way by outside intervention are likely to 
rationally reduce the motivational factors under their control, i.e., the intrinsic motivation.  
Third, an extensive external monitoring may undermine the transition country’s intrinsic 
motivation since it may be interpreted by the transition country how its intrinsic 
motivation and competence are not appreciated.  This may further lead to either impaired 
national self-esteem or to resentment towards the international community resulting 
finally in an impeded institutional transformation and a reduced economic growth rate. 
  Based on the above psychological processes, the hidden costs of control and 
reward in the case of a transition economy can be generalized as the following: (1) all 
external intervention including both control and reward can affect the transition   8 
economy’s intrinsic motivation; and (2) external intervention crowds-out intrinsic 
motivation if it is perceived to be controlling; it crowds-in intrinsic motivation if it is 
perceived to be supporting. 
  It is important to emphasize at this point that the psychological crowding theory 
relates only to the effect on motivation since that, rather than behavior, is what 
psychologists are interested in.  However, one can simultaneously account for the 
external control effect on institutional change which in turn determines the level of 
performance of the economy be it measured as the economic growth or social welfare.  
This kind of problem concerns economists and can be best modeled in the principal-agent 
setting. 
  A transition economy (an agent) adjusts its performance and institutional change 
P considering both benefits B and costs C incurred during the transition to markets 
process.  Benefits and costs are also influenced by the principal’s (international 
community’s) external intervention or pressure, E, both directly and indirectly, via the 
effect on the operating of internal (domestic) institutions and process, I, that are already 
in place and in operation.  This model can be presented with the following two equations: 
      B = B[P(I(E), E)],          (1) 
      C = C[P(I(E), E)].          (2) 
Both benefits and costs increase in performance, ∂B/∂P ≡ Bp > 0 and ∂C/∂P ≡ Cp > 0.  It 
is assumed furthermore that the transition economy rationally chooses the level of 
performance and institutional change P* that maximizes net benefits (B – C).  This yields 
the first order condition: 
      Bp = Bp.            (3) 
Differentiating further, this economic growth - social welfare maximizing condition with 
respect to E will show how the transition economy’s optimal performance P* is affected 
when the international community changes the extent of external pressure: 
    dP*/dE = (BPECPI - BPICPE) / (CPI - BPI) .      (4) 
The second-order partial derivatives are signed as following. 
a)  CPE < 0 implies that, based on the standard principal-agent theory, external 
intervention raises performance by imposing higher marginal cost on shirking, 
i.e., by lowering the marginal cost of performing. 
b)  CPI < 0 implies lower marginal cost of performing due to internal institutional 
adjustment made, based on intrinsic motivation of citizen and domestic/internal 
organizations and institutions. 
c)  BPI > 0 implies increasing marginal benefits of performance due to more efficient 
internally adjusted domestic institutions. 
d)  BPE is the crowding effect and can be positive, zero, or negative.  BPE > 0 is called 
the crowding-in effect and implies that the external pressure or intervention 
bolsters intrinsic motivation.  BPE = 0 implies that the crowding effect is neglected 
or, in other words, the change in external pressure does not affect the marginal 
level of performance.  Finally, the crowding-out effect, BPE < 0, implies that the 
external pressure or intervention subdues the intrinsic motivation. 
It is clear that the sign of the dP*/dE will depend on the nature of the crowding effect.  
The external pressure will always lower the performance in the presence of the crowding-
out effect or when the crowding effect is assumed zero (neglected).  Moreover, even if 
we have crowding-in effect in play, that is still not a guarantee that the external   9 
intervention will for sure result in higher level performance of the transition economy.  
Thus, the crowding-in effect of the increased external pressure or intervention is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the increased level of performance of the 
transition economy. 
  The crowding effect is in reality the response of individuals in transition society 
to external pressures.  What benefits external pressure to make quick and sweeping 
institutional changes will yield to a transition society is a matter of perceptions of 
individuals in that society.  In other words, following Wicksell (p. 79), “… whether the 
benefits of the proposed activity to the individual citizens would be greater than its cost 
to them, no one can judge this better than the individuals themselves.” 
 
4. Implications of External Pressures on Institutional Changes and Economic 
Growth in a Transition Economy 
Based on the above model, it is clear that external pressures may slow down economic 
growth due to the completely halted process of institutional change in a transition 
economy or even when some institutional changes are made based on external 
recommendations or recipes.  If this is to be put in the context of the organizational, or in 
this case the institutional portfolio theory, external factors in the institutional portfolio 
may lead in multiple ways to a lower level of economic performance of a transition 
economy.  Figure 1 contains the algorithm showing the paths towards improvement or 
decline in economic performance of a transition economy under the set of assumptions 
employed in this scenario. 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
  Internal (domestic) factors in this model are assumed to lead to a high 
performance level of the economy with a little need for further institutional change.  They 
ultimately lead towards long-term success in terms of goals such as sustainable economic 
growth and increasing social welfare.  This may not be a far-fetched assumption for many 
countries that recognized quickly what it is that they need to change in their existing 
institutions in order to be successful in their transition toward market economy.  Indeed, 
when the motivation for changing the political and economic system was intrinsic and 
know-how was there (e.g., such as in Hungary or in the Czech Republic), such economies 
needed little external guidance in order to succeed. 
  The impact of the external factors (pressure) on the economic performance of a 
transition economy is ambiguous.  The external pressures leading to a crowding-out 
effect or to the lack of crowding effect always result in a decline in economic 
performance of the transition economy.  Indeed, perceived distrust of the international 
organizations and institutions regarding the abilities or intentions of the internal 
institutions is likely to lead to “too much controlling” and to adversely impact the 
intrinsic motivation within the transition economy.  The external pressures leading to 
crowding-in effect may lead under certain circumstances toward long-term success (i.e., 
sustainable high economic growth rate and improved social welfare).  That is likely to 
happen when additional external pressures coincide with internal policies and 
institutional changes.  An already high performance level of the economy may be just 
reinforced by the external approval of the internal-domestic management of the transition 
process.  Minimal or no further institutional changes are needed to maintain the prospect 
of the long-term success under these circumstances.  A crowding-in effect, however, may   10 
lead to the moderate economic performance level as well.  This can happen when current 
internal institutions are not suited to deal with proposed transition programs and initial 
external pressure and assistance have only marginal impact on the economic 
performance.  If additional external pressures are constructive, internal (domestic) 
institutions may adapt to fit the circumstances and both domestic and external 
environments.  In turn, this institutional adaptation is likely to lead towards much 
improved economic performance in the long run.  On the other hand, if external pressures 
are perceived as threats and/or if there is a lack of understanding and ability on how to 
make adjustments in internal institutions, the economy is likely to follow the path of 
gradual decline illustrated in declining economic growth rates and lower welfare of its 
citizens. 
  Our model in its essence is consistent with basic public choice premises.  
Individuals within transition economies are aware of the choice environment.  That this 
assumption is actually reasonable has been recently documented in Mueller (2005) in his 
analysis of constitutional institutions in transition economies of Europe. Furthermore, 
there is clearly institutional barrier between the revealed expression of preference and 
direct satisfaction of individuals’ goals in the form of external pressure (or assistance) to 
follow a very specific (and possibly different) path of development and institutional 
change.  The failure in the transformation of a centrally planned to market economy 
emerges, to follow the language of Buchanan (1987, p. 247), “…not in the translation of 
individual preferences into outcomes, but in the possible presentation of some choosers 
with alternatives that do not correspond to those faced by others in the exchange nexus.”  
In other words, external players with their independent set of goals pressure the transition 
economy to follow a very specific path towards markets without considering the 
possibilities individuals within transition economies perceive as the alternatives for their 
future.  The process of institutional changes is political while its consequences are both 
political and economic in their nature.  Transition countries offer a unique opportunity to 
analyze electoral participation in the institutional changes during the early years of 
democratic development. These countries can be regarded as “new democracies”, with 
few people having actual memories of voting in democratic elections and thus experience 
of liberty of choosing the path of development. Many of the parties themselves are also 
new and have had relatively little time to establish a voter awareness to enable them to be 
used as an effective signal. There are also a larger number of political parties than is 
typically the case in western democracies. Hence there are reasons to suppose that the 
transactions costs of electoral participation are high relative to those of established 
democracies. But as against this the recent memory of a non-democratic past may 
enhance civic duty (Orviska, Caplanova, and Hudson 2001). In turn this leads to 
relatively larger number of potential strategies a country may pursue in its transition and 
voters can chose from.  Thus a great potential for crowding-out effect of any particular 
strategy that has been forwarded (externally) onto voters too forcefully exists. 
  One can see from the above analysis that the use of external pressure, 
interference, or assistance to modify internal transition processes and institutions must be 
carefully planned by the principal to fit the circumstances and characteristics of a specific 
transition economy.  Hence, our model is consistent with the World Bank’s latest 
assessment of how the international community must accept the multiplicity of paths 
leading to successful and operational market economies.  This all is true only if the   11 
principal has genuinely positive intentions to help the transitioning country to succeed in 
creating the economy compatible with the currently prevailing set of institutions within 
market economies.  However, when the principal’s interests differ from the interest of the 
transition economy, more complex strategic gaming is likely to capture their relationship 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1  Notable exceptions would be a few countries in Central Europe such as Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, or Poland which have a very rich history and a sense of national 
identity.  Some of these countries have been among leading capitalist economies in the 
pre-World War II Europe.  Transition to market economy for these countries is, in many 
ways, going back to where they used to be several decades ago and market institutions 
are not a mysterious unknown to them.  On the other hand, some countries made a leap 
from feudal or quasi-feudal society to communism directly, and the way a market 
economy of capitalism operates is likely somewhat of a mystery to them. 